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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1959
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND APPEALS
By DANIEL S. HOFFMAN
Associate in the Denver firm of Fugate, May and Mitchem
and
EDWARD S. BARLOCK
Former Editor-in-Chief of DICTA, now serving in the United States Navy
In this article the authors have brought together decisions of the
Colorado Supreme Court from January 1, 1958 to January 1, 1959.
Only those cases involving procedure and appeals which suggest or
clarify principles of significance are the subject of comment.
REQUISITE OF PROHIBITION-AN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
Several cases came before the Colorado Supreme Court in 1958
as original proceedings in the nature of prohibition provided for in
Rule 106 (a) (4).' In two instances, the supreme court discharged its
rule to show cause, holding on each occasion that the circumstances did
not warrant relief in the form of prohibition.
In Prinster v. District Court' the plaintiffs sought to restrain the
lower court judge from hearing a case in which they had been named
among the defendants. Several holders of decreed water priorities filed
a complaint in the district court praying, in part, for an injunction
against alleged usurpations of their water rights. The priorities were
held under a 1948 adjudication. Some of the defendants in the district
court appeared specially and moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the 1948 adjudication decrees were null and void. The
district court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the defendants
to answer the complaint. Thereupon some of the district court defend-
ants sought prohibition. The district court plaintiffs appeared before
the supreme court and answered on the merits.
The majority of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hall, re-
iterated the long standing requisite for relief in the form of prohibition:
the supreme court will only prevent the exercise of lower court juris-
diction not granted by law.' The court further found that prohibition
was not a proper remedy to restrain a trial court from committing error
in deciding a question properly before it. Thus the court applied the
cardinal rule that so long as the lower tribunal has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter, it is competent to proceed to a final
legal determination, subject to an appellate power of review.'
The majority opinion noted that the mere fact that issues of great
public importance are involved does not per se warrant the application
of prohibition.' Similarly, the mere fact that a lower court trial will
involve great expense and certain appeal does not warrant the appli-
cation of prohibition. Thus the court shifted the emphasis of many
former opinions by stressing the absolute necessity of a jurisdictional
excess.'
I Colo. R. Civ. P. 106 (a) (4).
p325 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1958).
See 73 C.J.S. Prohibition § 2 (b) (1951).
4 Id. at Prohibition § 11.
5325 P.2d at 940.
' Ibid. But cf. cases cited in the dissent by Mr. Justice Moore, 325 P.2d at 942.
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In the final analysis the court refrained from deciding the water
right issue through the use of prohibition as a matter of convenience
to the parties' or as a technique for establishing principle and
precedent."
In Leonhart v. District Court' the plaintiff sought to restrain the
district court from proceeding with a new trial. Plaintiff claimed the
issues under consideration had been foreclosed by a determination of
a foreign court through an application of the principle of res judicata.
The supreme court again held that prohibition was a proper remedy
only where the lower court was exceeding its jurisdiction. Prohibition
would not lie to avoid mere errors in the determination of the law.
In particular the court found that a defense of res judicata does
not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, nor establish a claim in the
nature of prohibition; a conclusion well supported by case law in other
jurisdictions."0
NECESSITY OF MOVING FOR NEW TRIAL WHEN LESS
THAN ALL CLAIMS DISMISSED
One of last year's more important cases involving a procedural
issue is Graham v. District Court,' where it was held that an order of
dismissal under Rule 41 (b) (1) 1 is an adjudication on the merits
whether it is directed to counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party
claims. This is true unless otherwise indicated by the court.
In the Graham case purchasers of realty sued their vendors and
two brokers for fraud. The vendors and the second broker cross-claimed
against the first broker, who, in turn, cross-claimed against the second
broker. The trial court sustained motions to dismiss all cross-claims and
granted the purchasers' motion for a directed verdict against the first
broker. Thereafter, the first broker filed a motion for a new trial. The
purchasers did not move for a new trial. Without notice to the vendors
or the second broker, the trial court granted the first broker's motion
for a new trial and made it effective as to all the parties. The supreme
court applied Rule 41'" and held that the trial court was without power
to grant a new trial as to all the parties. The purchasers' failure to move
for a new trial within the time permitted by Rule 59" was a fatal
procedural error. The purchasers were obliged to make their motion,
if at all, within ten days after the entry of the appropriate judgment.
This case is sound; Rule 41"1 is clearly and exactly applied. Rule
54,16 relating to judgments on multiple claims, is held inapplicable.
The Graham case says simply that unless a timely motion for a new trial
is made by the proper party in interest, a dismissal as to one of a group
of multiple claims operates as an adjudication on the merits as to that
claim. This is true regardless of the disposition of other claims in the
same action, notwithstanding the apparent conflict between Rule 41
and Rule 54.
7 See note 4, supro.
See 73 C.J.S. Prohibition § 8 (1951).
p329 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1958).
10 See Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1283, 1293 (1945).
11 323 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1958).
1
2
Colo. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (1).
1 Ibid.
14 Colo. R. Civ. P. 59 (b).
15 Id. 41 (b) (1).16 Id. 54 (a), (b).
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The case illustrates a proper situation calling for the application
of a claim in the nature of prohibition.
RETURN OF SERVICE AND THE NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE
The underlying purpose and spirit of Colorado's non-resident
motorist statute" was given full expression in Nelson v. District Court.'
The facts were clear and undisputed. There was a proper service, but
there was no statutory compliance to demonstrate return and proof of
service". The court determined that the failure of the plaintiff to com-
ply with the statutory procedures following completion of service does
not add or detract from the validity of process and service.
The court pointed out that there may be valid service and a de-
fective return or invalid service and a return showing valid service."° A
sound analysis of the purpose of the return of service was made by the
court. That purpose is to enable the trial judge to make an intelligent
finding that the court has in fact acquired jurisdiction, or has not ac-
quired jurisdiction, because of some defect in the process or the service
of process.
Jurisdiction of the Colorado court attaches when the service is
completed. The return deals with proof and is vital only if the plain-
tiff appears in court and seeks to prove service entitling him to a default
judgment."
WRIT OF ERROR FILED - TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION ENDED
Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Denver' illustrates a harsh application
of a sound jurisdictional principle. Denver sued out a writ of error
seeking to reverse an adverse trial court judgment. While this writ was
pending in the supreme court, the trial judge vacated the lower court
judgment. Denver then moved to dismiss its writ of error without prej-
udice; this motion was granted. Denver recovered a favorable judgment
at the re-trial. Davidson then sued out its timely writ of error based on
the ground that the trial court could not vacate a judgment rendered
by it after the supreme court had acquired jurisdiction of the cause
through proceedings on error. The supreme court sustained Davidson's
contentions and vacated the judgment granted at the re-trial. The su-
preme court further ordered that the original trial judgment in favor of
Davidson be restored to its full force and effect, 3 since Denver had
withdrawn its original writ and had not then sought review within the
proper time under Rule 1 L."
The high court, however, permitted the trial court to ascertain the
validity of the original judgment. The court noted that their reinstate-
ment of this first judgment was not a determination as to whether or
not that judgment was substantively valid, voidable, or void. The court's
logic on this point is unassailable. If, in fact, the original judgment was
void, as compared to voidable, a mere failure to seek review in time
could not validate it. The trial court then vacated the original judg-
ment, in effect, for the second time. On review, the supreme court found
17 Colo. Rev. Stot. § 13-8-2 (1953).
2" 320 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1958).
1" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-8-3 (1953).,
"0 320 P.2d at 963.
21 Ibid.
"2328 P.2d 377 (Colo. 1958); and see 330 P.2d 1116 (Colo. t958).
23 328 P.2d at 379.
2, Colo. R. Civ. P. 111 (b).
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the judgment to be voidable, not void, and therefore not subject to at-
tack, since the time to review that original judgment had passed. 5
One principle emerges with uncertain clarity: when the appellate
court acquires jurisdiction of a cause, the lower court's powers are finally
suspended pending further directions from the higher court." Thus
Denver lost its opportunity to seek appellate redress by an apparently
unwarranted reliance on the extra-jurisdictional ruling of the lower
court.
This comment does not extend itself to the issue of due process
raised by Denver. The supreme court rather summarily dispensed with
that argument which is not within the scope of this analysis.
VACATING JUDGMENTS "UPON SUCH TERMS As ARE JUST"
In Prather v. District Court," the plaintiff sought to restrain the
lower court from imposing a bond requirement as a condition of vacat-
ing a cognovit note judgment against him. The trial judge had ap-
parently acted within his determination of the scope of Rule 60 (b),"
which provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment
in certain enumerated circumstances "upon such terms as are just." The
judge had fixed the bond in an amount equal to the demand and
prayer of the lower court plaintiff. The supreme court found such a
bond to be unwarranted and further noted that such action by the
trial judge involved a degree of predetermination of the merits.
Perhaps, the supreme court could have been more incisive in its
ruling by holding the imposition of a bond in such an amount to be an
abuse of the trial court's discretion in the particular circumstances. Cer-
tainly, this holding cannot mean the trial court is without any power
to impose reasonable conditions on its decision to grant relief from a
judgment. The bond should not be objectionable only because the trial
court had to concern itself with the probable outcome of the case before
a full hearing on the merits: this, by analogy, is often a prime considera-
tion in. granting injunctive relief of a temporary nature.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RAISED UNDER A GENERAL DENIAL
In Denning v. A. D. Wilson & Co.29 the defendant counter-claimed
seeking penalty recoveries under the 1913 Money Lenders Act." Plain-
tiff replied by alleging " 'Said counter-claim is barred by the statute of
limitations of this State in such case made and provided.' ""' The su-
preme court held this reply to be a sufficient pleading within the scope
and spirit of Rule 8 (c) '2 relating to the pleading of affirmative defenses.
The supreme court commented that even a general denial would
have been sufficient to raise the issue of the statute of limitations with
regard to a claim for a penalty recovery under the Money Lenders Act.
It is generally held that a statute of limitations bars only a given remedy;
it does not extinguish the right to a claim.3" Thus, other remedies may
be available or the right to a remedy may be revived by a proper ac-
26330 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1958).
20 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 617 (1957).
27328 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1958).
29 Colo. R. Civ P. 60 (b).
29326 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1958).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 73-3-7 (1953).
31 326 P.2d at 790.
.'Colo. R. Civ. P. 8 (c).
353 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 6 (b) (1948).
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knowledgment of the obligation or claim. However, where the particu-
lar limitation is part and parcel of the very statute creating the right and
liability, most courts determine that both the right and the remedy are
extinguished forever.3 ' The supreme court indicated that the require-
ment of affirmatively pleading a statute of limitations under Rule 8 (c)
does not extend to this latter situation and this observation is well sup-
ported by other authorities. " The dictum of the Denning case has
obvious application to other statutory claims.
HABEAS CORPUS CANNOT DIVEST A COURT OF ITS PROPER JURISDICTION.
Zimmerman v. Angele3 ' held that habeas corpus may not be used
in lieu of a writ of error. In the Zimmerman case the county court had
entered an order committing the respondent therein to the state hospital
for the insane until discharged according to law. Subsequently a peti-
tion was filed in the county court seeking an order of restoration to
reason. While the petition was pending, habeas corpus was brought in
the district court to secure the respondent's release. The supreme court
held that an order by the district court discharging her was void since
the district court lacked jurisdiction over the cause. If the commitment
order was erroneous, a writ of error or a restoration petition was avail-
able. Habeas corpus was held to lie only where a court excercising
jurisdiction has no power to exercise that jurisdiction. The case is well
documented by supporting authority.
DISTRICT COURT HABEAS CORPUS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDING
In contrast to the Zimmerman case, it was held in Johnson v.
Black, 7 that the district court had jurisdiction in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding brought by a mother to determine whether her child was being
unlawfully detained by its grandparents. The district court had juris-
diction in spite of the fact that the grandparents were awaiting the de-
termination of an adoption proceeding brought by them in the juvenile
court. The supreme court found the jurisdiction of the district court and
34 Ibid.
3554 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 357 (b) (1948).
36321 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1958).
37 322 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1958).
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the juvenile court to be merely simultaneous, not concurrent. The high
court further found the issues before the two courts to be of a different
nature, so that the determination of one court would not affect the
determination of the other court.
DEFECTIVE SERVICE DOES NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL
In Fletcher v. District Court,8 the lower court plaintiffs had the
defendants served with a copy of the summons stating the action was
in one district court, while the copy of the complaint stated the action
was in another district court. The original summons and complaint
indicated the action to be in the court named on the copy of the com-
plaint. The action was filed in the court named on the copy and origi-
nal of the complaint.
Rule 4 (c) " requires that the name of the court be so stated on the
summons. Rule 4 (e)" requires that personal service be accomplished
by the delivery of a copy of process to the defendant. The supreme
court found the summons to be void, so that no jurisdiction could attach
over the lower court defendants. However, the supreme court found
that the defective process did not warrant a dismissal. The lower court
should have quashed the summons and required the plaintiff to re-serve
the defendant, so that jurisdiction could properly attach over the person
of the defendant.
38322 P.2d 96 (Colo. 1958).
39 Colo. R. Civ. P. 4 (c).40 
Id. 4 (e).
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